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Article 8

: Book Reviews

BOOK REVIEWS
The Nominalistic Principle. By Eliyahu Hirschberg, Ph.D. Jerusalem,
Israel: Bar Ilan University. 1971. Pp. 138.
Should the equilibrium between the rights and obligations of contracting parties according to the manifest intent at the time of the
making be maintained despite changes in the value of money? Eliyahu
Hirschberg thinks so, and has devoted much of his book to inquiry as to
the need to protect private rights from monetary change, taking into
account the purchasing power included in the sum of money when the
contract was made. These rights, he asserts, are at the mercy of a
government which adopts the nominalistic approach.
Illustrating the operation of the nominalistic principle-a dollar is
always a dollar in the eyes of the law-the author cites the case of
Anderson v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 42
T. L. R. 302: "In 1887 a life insurance contract was made in St.
Petersburg and its monetary obligation was fixed in German marks. The
premium was paid during the whole duration of the contract. In 1922
the insured died. The claim was filed when German inflation had
reached its climax. The sum awarded was barely sufficient for the
purchase of a packet of cigarettes." Conceding that deviation from
nominalism causes difficulties in the public sector by disturbing "the
equivalence between expenses and revenues," and drawing a distinction
between "short-term transactions," "medium-term transactions," (contracts of sale, supply, etc.), and "long-term transactions" (mortgages,
long-term credit, certain insurance policies, bonds listed on the stock
exchange, etc.), Dr. Hirschberg insists that "the changes in the monetary and political sphere during the duration of long-term contracts are
so frequent and so rapid that no relationship exists between the anticipaions of the parties when the contract was made and its maturity." He
suggests as alternative solutions "qualified valorism," and revaluation of
debts.
Author Hirschberg traces the history of valorism from its beginning in
the nineteenth century, and discusses its adoption in Germany during an
inflationary period comparable to that of the Confederate South during
the Civil War. Valorism regards the extent of a monetary obligation not
as defined by a nominal sum of money or the metallic value of such
sum, but as determined by the purchasing power of such sum of money,
thus the valoristic principle is "not a principle of the law of currency but
of the law of obligation." In commercial intercourse, according to the
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nominalistic solution, the extent of a monetary obligation is absolutely
and unconditionally fixed and thus easily understood; in contradistinction, the extent of that obligation according to the valoristic principle is
more difficult to ascertain, and is given effect through a measure of
value like a cost of living index and/or index of wholesale commodity
prices. Asserting that "attempts to create an abstract measure of value
which will function as a substitute for national currency have not met
success," Dr. Hirschberg offers three possible solutions to problems
arising due to price fluctuations: (a) authorization of trial court to
apply appropriate index, (b) division of different bargains into different
classes, and (c) arbitrary adoption of one index to ascertain changes in
the purchasing power of money.
Revaluation applies to debts and not currency. Contending that "revaluation faces the past, valorism faces the future," the author illustrates
his discussion of this theoretical solution with a detailed account of
revaluation in Germany during its catastrophic post World War I period,
and of revaluation in the southern United States in the post Civil War
period. The judiciary took the initiative in revaluation in Germany,
beginning with a 1923 judgment of the Supreme Court in a case which
concerned the right of redemption of a mortgage registered prior to
World War I on a certain tract situated within a German colony which
was taken over by the British. The Supreme Court decided that the
debtor was not entitled to repay the debt in depreciated money.
No common standard was known in the evaluation; lower courts had
broad discretion but were "directed to take into account the value of the
dollar, the cost of living index, the wholesale commodity price index, the
market price of certain commodities, and a special index prepared by
Zeiler, one of the members of the Supreme Court." The author considers
revaluation an emergency solution and not a theoretical alternative
solution to nominalism; and in contradistinction to valorism "it does not
suggest its own solution and an independent approach to the problem of
the content of a monetary obligation," but strives to find a just and
practical solution to the new situation.
This book is a revised version of part of a study in monetary law,
accepted by the University of London as the author's M. Phil. (Laws)
thesis. It is written in the ponderous, scholarly language of research.
With a multi-language bibliography listing more than a hundred references, Dr. Hirschberg has adequately supported the pros and cons of his
argument. Among solutions offered by him are a return to the metallic
standard, restriction or partial or complete abolition of the nominalistic
principle in private law, and an adequate system of constitutional safeguards. As to these safeguards, Dr. Hirschberg states in his concluding
paragraphs that "the ideal solution, however, would be a legislative
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instrument, prepared before any emergency, for the solution of the
problems arising as a result of changes in the value of money." He goes
no further; he does not outline contents of the "legislative instrument",
nor does he suggest appropriate legislative bodies or other organization
guidelines for administration. This is unfortunate and disappointing, as
the writer has probed so deeply into a fundamental matter on which
comparatively little has been written in the United States. The uniqueness of the book, and the present inflationary near-crisis enhance the
value of such a treatise and recommend it of priority on any law
student's reading list.
MILDRED

B. PAYTON*

* B.S., A. & T. State College, 1939; LL.B., North Carolina College at Durham,
1963; M.T., East Central State College, 1967; Associate Professor of Law, North Caro-

lina Central University School of Law.
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Race, Racism, and American Law. By Derrick A. Bell, Jr. Little, Brown
and Company, 1973. Pp. 1076.
This monumental work, written at a time when critics within and
without America are questioning the country's commitment to equal
justice to all, is both comprehensive and provocative. The author, a
professor of law at Harvard Law School and formerly a civil rights
attorney for the NAACP, has compiled cases and relevant social science
materials to focus on the problem of racism.
The book begins with an historical analysis of slavery. It includes a
lengthy excerpt from the 1857 Dred Scott opinion in which Chief
Justice Taney sanctioned the official policy of political circles for the
treatment of Blacks. To document his suggestion that the governmental
triumvirate was against Blacks, Bell illustrates with selected court cases,
(e.g., The Armistad Case, Brandenburg v. Metropolitan Package Store
Association, Ali v. United States) and excerpts from notable scholars on
the subject, including John Hope Franklin's The Emancipation Proclamation. Not only does the book portray the vicious prongs of racism
toward Blacks, but in Chapter 2, similar treatment received by other
non-white groups is summarized. Part I ends the question of whether
America's laws can be used as instruments of social change.
With the assumption that the benefits of democracy accrue from the
recognition of citizenship, Bell in Part II outlines how these promises
(voting, marriage, protecting access to public facilities, military service)
to Black citizens are flouted and unfulfilled. The right to education, also
a citizen's right, is treated separately in Part III because the author
asserts that "the struggle on the part of Blacks to attain an education has
been and currently is an important ingredient for personal success and
the foundation upon which all legal claims to full citizenship for Blacks
have been built." (p. 431). The avowed counterparts of educationhousing, employment and right to personal justice-are the focal points
of Parts IV, V, and VI. Thus, Bell presents to the reader a casebook
approach to the study of racism in law from a perspective not often
emphasized in the basic law school curriculum.
As stated before, the purpose of this book is to enable an in depth
study of the significance of laws and decisions dealing with racial issues.
Why? Because, as the author states, "many of the changes in racial
patterns and policies attributed to civil rights" cases are now regarded as
obsolete and have little if any contemporary value. For example, while
noting that although Brown v. Board of Education promised Blacks an
integrated education, the author, through the use of inserted materials,
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questions the value of an integrated education per se. Through excerpted writings, the book reminds the reader that many school districts even
now maintain segregated schools. Alternatives to integration such as
community control and free schools are discussed by noted authorities in
the field of education. Courts have strengthened fair employment laws,
but workers' attempts to bring about a change through self-help methods have resulted in subsequent discharge in most cases. The courts are
unable or unwilling to provide adequate relief in these cases.
Underlying the main thesis is the point that lawyers should adopt a
more pragmatic approach to racial problems and should fashion legal
remedies for Black clients who, having won the symbols, need the
substance of equal opportunity. Throughout the book, for class discussion purposes and for developing legal strategies to attack racism, Bell
has written seventeen hypothetical litigation problems, called "Racism
Hypos." The suggested use is to assign student teams to represent and
present oral arguments for the parties. Each argument is to be judged by
the class to determine the winning side. Hopefully from this verbal
interplay and exchange, students can formulate legal strategies to use
when confronted with real situations.
These hypos are interspersed within the six parts of the book. Not
only are hypos used to provoke ideas as to strategy, but the materials,
notes, and questions after the sections augment this design. For example, in Chapter Six, "The Right to Interracial Sex and Marriage," (the
case of Loving v. Virginia (1967) which invalidated miscegenation
laws), Bell points out in a note that post-Loving state legislatures did
not hasten to repeal outdated miscegenation statutes. Some state courts
refused to recgonize the Loving decision. In U.S. v. Britain, 319 F.
Supp. 1058, the court voided Alabama statutes relied on by a probate
judge who refused a white army sergeant a license to marry a Black
woman.
In another area, conscientious objection to military service, the author
pointed out that the Supreme Court in the Cassius Clay case (Muhammad Ali v. U.S. 403 U.S. 698 (1971)) reversed the conviction on
procedural grounds, thus avoiding a direct holding that Muslim beliefs
qualify for conscientious objector status.
Another illustration of this technique is found on p. 58 where Arnold
Schuchter's Reparations (a discussion of reparations paid to the Jews by
the Germans) is excerpted. Here, the question is posed: Is not the
difficulty in organizing powerless people the main reason why the
Emancipation Proclamation experience has been repeated during the
last one hundred years in subsequent civil rights laws and decisions?
Though one may nurture an inkling that the author's selection of
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materials was to feather his nest of biasness, such a notion disappears
under the weight of support of scholars in various fields that accords
with his thesis. Bell, to say the least, is inconclusive on many points. He
does, however, present vital issues faced by this country and indicates
how these issues were handled in the past. His own article, "School
Litigation Strategies for the 1970's: New Phases in the Continuing
Quest for Quality Schools" (p. 574), merely describes rather than
takes sides with the issue of decentralized (local) control of Black
schools. The sources upon which he relies are in the main primary,
projecting a balanced attempt to penetrate the promises of America to
all citizens to evaluate whether they have been fulfilled. The bibliographical materials are critical of the topics for which they were selected; some are prefaced with comments by the author as to their relevance
and significance.
Admittedly, even though it is currently fashionable in many places
throughout America to disclaim and even denounce the existence of
racist practr.es (exclude the President's Commission on Urban Disorders, 1969, and the famous or infamous Dred Scott decision), the
author sparingly uses rival viewpoints. His use of Franklin's Emancipation Proclamation (p. 55), which projected the view that Lincoln's
motives for "freeing the slaves" were basically the result of humanitarian
or moral imperatives, is unpersuasive to some Black scholars. Reference
is made to Jensen's article, "How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic
Achievement?" (p. 86) which many Blacks assert is avowedly racist.
One may say that this work is noteworthy for its absence of unsupported
generalizations and sweeping assertions without insufficient evidence.
Without reservation, the book may be relied on for its forthrightness
and straight-forwardness in meeting the fundamental issue of racism in
our society. The author's use of sources and treatment of the issues are
commendable. His reliance on and use of non-legal materials may be
questioned by some of the legally trained as unsound and not analytical. However, those critics should address themselves to comments Bell
makes concerning the overall thrust of Chapter Three, "Ending Racism
Through Law." The question is put as follows: "Why do judicial
opinions ignore available knowledge on the subject (race) while continuing to accept the myths about race-which, are, of course, no less
dangerous because their accuracy is assumed?" (p. 117). Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson that the Constitution is color-blind is
of questionable value as posed by materials in the book. Does Taney's
dictum that Blacks "had no rights which the whites were bound to
respect" remain a tenet of the American creed? Can the law be used as a
vehicle for correcting racial injustices? These questions and more are
confronted and discussed in the book.
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Along with other classics in this field such as Dubois' Black Reconstruction, Frazier's The Negro Family in the United States and Franklin's From Slavery to Freedom, this work, in time, should receive similar
deserving acceptance.
CHARLES HOLMES*
* J.D., North Carolina Central University 1975. Mr. Holmes is currently teaching in the Department of Political Science at Jackson State University.
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